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by Simon Pirani Gazprom will this year
become significantly more transparent, with separate accounting by
production, transport and distribution subsidiaries – but will not hive
off transport assets into a separate company. Progress on third-party
pipeline access, and abolition of the “ring fence” separating
domestically- and internationally-traded shares, are two other prongs
of new reform plans rolled out after the presidential election.
The importance that President Vladimir
Putin attaches to gas sector reform was highlighted by the mention he
gave it at his first second-term press conference, in the small hours
of Monday 15 March, once his easy victory was confirmed. Putin’s statement that “we must take care
with Gazprom”, and that domestic prices can not rise to European levels
“overnight”, were widely publicised. He added that reform must
continue, including towards free access for non-Gazprom producers to
pipelines but not export markets, and “transparency of the [state]
Gazprom shareholding”. (See box.) Three days later, Gazprom ceo Aleksei
Miller announced his transparency initiative. So Gazprom’s prospects during Putin’s
second term are now much clearer. Miller will go ahead with Kremlin
backing, and reform plans floated by German Gref’s economic development
ministry, which envisaged breaking up Gazprom into a transport company
and a series of production companies have effectively been dumped. A senior Gazprom source, speaking to GBI on
condition of anonymity, said: “Gas sector reform is urgent. But we
don’t believe that breaking up Gazprom will solve the fundamental
problems of low domestic prices and the need for transport
infrastructure investment. And we have convinced the president of
this.” Progress may be expected as follows: On transparency,
plans to unravel the opaque finances of Gazprom subsidiaries were
drafted by a working group on corporate structure headed by Miller
himself and one of his senior deputies, Aleksandr Anenkov, and agreed
at a meeting with other executives and government officials on 18
March. All subsidiaries that combine production,
transport and other functions will establish divisions corresponding to
those areas of activity, a company press release stated – so that work
on “separating-out cash flows from production, transportation,
processing, storage and sales of gas and liquid hydrocarbons” will be
completed by the end of the year. Low-pressure distribution assets belonging
to 17 Gazprom-controlled gas transport companies will be concentrated
in a dedicated entity, Regiongaskholding; production service assets
will be transferred to production subsidiaries; gas storage will
comprise a separate subsidiary. Non-core assets including social
welfare and telecommunications will be separated out. Miller said, in an interview with Vedomosti
newspaper, that the changes would make transportation costs “absolutely
clear and transparent” by the start of 2005, “which is important for
the setting of transport tariffs”. The announcement was greeted by market
reformers have long criticised Gazprom’s internal opacity. Andrei
Sharonov, Gref’s first deputy at the economic development ministry,
said it was a “vital step towards gas sector reform”. It could also
reasonably be interpreted as something akin to the “accounting
unbundling” required by the first EU Gas Directive. A Gazprom source said managers throughout
the company had accepted the need for transparency, and discussion is
now focusing on how to finance transport infrastructure investment.
“If, for example, an independent producer wishes to build and manage a
pipeline from its production facility to a trunk line, Gazprom is happy
with that. Both Itera and Yukos already have such pipelines. “But what about other investments, for
compressor station construction or trunk line upgrades? Some Gazprom
managers say we should finance such projects 50-50 with the independent
producers. But how will the independent recoup his investment? The
obvious way is by discounting his transport tariff – but the tariff is
set in law and there is no mechanism for discounts. Other managers say
we should sign long-term ‘take-or-pay’ and ‘transport-or-pay’ contracts
with the independents, such as we have ourselves with the Poles, Czechs
or Germans – and this argument is gaining force.” Third-party pipeline access is an area in which
opinion among Gazprom managers is also shifting. Deputy ceo Aleksandr
Ryazanov said recently that “specific quantities” of independent
producers’ gas could be exported, provided they agreed to supply the
domestic regulated market. Igor Plotnikov, head of Gazprom’s
information and analysis centre, told GBI that exports by non-Gazprom
producers would only start on two conditions: first, that they go
“through a single export channel, and that means Gazeksport”.
Otherwise, “Russian gas will be competing with itself on the European
market, which is great for consumers there, but bad for the Russian gas
industry. And we won’t allow that.” Secondly, independent producers would have
to sell to Russia’s regulated domestic market. “Yes, Gazprom gets the
advantages of high export prices. But we also have to sell at regulated
prices to residential users in southern Russia, where, in some areas,
non-payment is as high as 50%. Let the independents share both
markets.” On Gazprom’s shareholding structure, Putin’s
remark that it needed to be transparent was greeted with a chorus of
excitement by investors. A poll of market analysts by the oil and gas
industry information service NGV.ru showed them unanimous in
interpreting Putin’s comments as confirmation that the promised
abolition of the “ring fence”, separating those shares quoted on the
domestic markets and much more highly-priced American Depositary
Receipts (ADRs) traded internationally, will go ahead. Christopher Granville, political strategy
analyst at the Moscow-based United Financial Group, said: “The context
only allows for one interpretation: the conversion of the so-called
treasury stock [about 10% of Gazprom shares held by the company itself]
into direct [i.e. state] shareholding as the political precondition for
the share market unification.” The remaining frustration for market
reformers is that the increase in Russian domestic gas prices will
continue gradually. But at least Putin is frank about it, and Gazprom
managers are energetically lobbying for price reform to go faster. Plotnikov at Gazprom said: “The fact that
our gas is sold domestically at fixed state prices, that don’t allow
for investment, is our biggest single problem – and the price the state
must pay for gas sector reform is the liberalisation of domestic gas
prices. That is the key factor in enabling us to raise funds for
investment in new production and in transport system upgrades. “If we had agreed to separate out the
transport division before price reform is completed, the industry would
have been in an even worse position for raising investment capital. At
least as a strong, vertically-integrated company with export revenues,
Gazprom can raise substantial loan capital on the international
markets. A stand-along transport company couldn’t do that.” What Putin
exactly said The centralisation of power in Russia means
that president Putin’s every word means much more than, for example,
those of his predecessor, president Yeltsin. And his decision to
mention gas reform at his post-election press conference was
significant. He said: “Gas is sold both to residential
and industrial users at prices below world levels, and to a significant
extent we ensure the economic growth of other industries at Gazprom’s
expense. This is a fact that mustn’t be forgotten. If we introduce
world prices overnight, then we would tomorrow have to sell gas to our
consumers at the same price as prevails in western Europe, $110 per
thousand cubic metres. That’s impossible. And so we must take care with
Gazprom.” Putin added that reform would continue, and that meant “free
access to pipelines for independent producers, although that does not
mean unlimited entry to the export market”; it also means that “there
must be transparency of the Gazprom share holding”. (Source: Prime Tass and NesProm.ru news
services, and Russian newspapers.)
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| A version of this
article appeared in Gas Matters,
March 2004. Posted April 2004; © 2004 Simon Pirani |